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Academic and political debates on peace and conflict dynamics increasingly 
acknowledge the relevance of the interaction between global and subnation-
al or local dynamics but rather neglect the regional neighbourhood as an 
important intervening variable. The concept of “regional peace formations” 
either as an enabling or hindering factor for peacebuilding fills this gap. 
Empirical evidence from Latin America, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan 
Africa shows the added value of the concept for explaining regional differ-
ences.
 • Peacebuilding is a complex undertaking shaped by a variety of factors such as 
the nature of conflicts, the actors involved, and local contexts. A regional per-
spective regarding patterns of conflict and violence shows high levels of varia-
tion between regions.
 • The concept of regional peace formations is an important tool to analyse the 
region-specific variation in actors and conflict dynamics. It allows us to identify 
either convergent or divergent contexts for peacebuilding.
 • Empirical evidence from Latin America, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Af-
rica identifies relevant differences and the need to incorporate regional factors 
into peacebuilding strategies.
Policy Implications
The regional level of peacebuilding offers the possibility for meaningful donor 
coordination and joint multilateral action. But a minimalistic approach seeking 
only the end of war or a certain degree of stabilisation is not enough. Initia-
tives need a clear focus on long-term peacebuilding, as a process of constructive 
conflict transformation. Regional economic and social networks are central to 
sustainable development, and to transforming structural conditions – leading 
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The Missing Piece – The Regional Dimension
Peacebuilding is a complex undertaking shaped by a variety of different factors. 
These include the ripeness of a conflict as well as other properties of war and vio-
lence such as power relations between the armed groups involved. Regional and 
international contexts such as norms or aid patterns also influence peace and con-
flict transformation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations as well as in-
ternational donors have increasingly supported peacebuilding as a transformative 
process under the former’s “Agenda for Peace” (Boutros-Ghali 1992). Sustainable 
Development Goal (SDG) 16 aims at the supporting of peaceful, just, and inclusive 
societies with strong institutions, including not just the termination of war but also 
a broader notion of violence prevention.
In the 1990s, Central America, Southern Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Bal-
kans became testing grounds for the “liberal peace” paradigm based on the experi-
ences of Western countries’ own trajectories. Key elements were negotiated forms 
of war termination, post-war democratisation, and state-building (Paris 2004). 
However, empirical evidence that this “one size fits all” approach works in contexts 
with different historical and cultural backgrounds under current global conditions 
is limited at best. Local conditions, as well as their interaction with external and 
global dynamics, shape the outcomes of peacebuilding (Lewis, Heathershaw, and 
Megoran 2018). Comparative Area Studies (CAS) is a promising methodological 
approach to this end, one combining area expertise with disciplinary approaches. 
This allows for the identifying not only of regional or even universal trends but also 
for the grasping of the variety of outcomes when global, regional, and local actors as 
well as structures interact (Ahram, Köllner, and Sil 2018). 
A mapping of the regional experiences with conflict, violence, and peacebuild-
ing between 1990 and 2018 provides evidence that this avenue of research is prom-
ising (see Figures 1–6 below). Based on available data sets, the following figures 
show variation in armed conflict per year (Gleditsch et al. 2002).
 • Most armed conflicts happened in sub-Saharan Africa, while Europe saw a low 
number of such events – Northern Ireland aside, mostly in the Balkans and 
the countries of the former Soviet Union. However within the different world 
regions, single countries seem to have driven regional trends. Most of South 
Asia’s armed conflicts happened in India, while Latin American trends after 
1990 were shaped by Colombia. 
 • The debate on collective violence focuses on two types of conflicts or incompat-
ibilities: control of territory and government. Challenged territorial control has 
historically triggered conflict and violence across the globe. Government con-
flicts, on the other hand, are about political order and the legitimacy thereof. 
The regional distribution of conflict issues or incompatibilities is also interest-
ing. Latin America only experienced armed conflicts on the topic of govern-
ment; territorial conflicts dominated in Europe, South Asia, and in Southeast 
Asia (SEA) and the Pacific. 
 • The data confirms that interstate armed conflicts are rare, and most are rather 
intra-state or internationalised intra-state ones. Here, Southeast Asia and the 
Pacific as well as Latin America stand out with mere internal armed conflicts. 
Proportionally, Central Asia and Europe show high levels of conflict interna-
tionalisation.
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 • Regarding conflict termination, the regional patterns are less obvious. Europe 
and Latin America reveal high numbers of peace agreements; Central Asia is 
the only region where military victories dominate – a form of war termina-
tion that seemed to become less important after 1990 from a global perspective 
(Kreutz 2010).
 • Interestingly, focusing on one-sided and non-state forms of armed violence 
seems to bring slightly different results. While sub-Saharan Africa was most 
affected in this regard, no clear patterns arise for the other regions. This might 
also be related to variation in the availability of data. During the last few dec-
ades, many data projects focused on sub-Saharan Africa and only included oth-
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Regional Peace Formations (RPFs) – The Concept
Due to the variation per regional patterns, the regional dimension should thus be 
integrated into our conception of peacebuilding and the ensuing programmes for 
pursuing it. However, understanding the role of regional politics in preparing for 
the transition from war and violence to more peaceful settings necessitates taking 
a fresh look at how regional dynamics contribute to the initiation and escalation 
of violence within a defined state. To this end, shifting the analytical focus to the 
regional level requires the adoption of new epistemological tools that take region-
alism as the point of reference for fathoming how some regions play constructive 
roles in ending violent intra-state conflicts while others render peacebuilding en-
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Based on the model of “regional conflict formation” (RCF) (Rubin, Armstrong, 
and Ntegeye 2001), two basic analytical types of regional settings (i.e. convergent 
and divergent) emerge. The different characteristics of each type might explain the 
variance in peacebuilding outcomes that we observe from one region to the other. 
The RCF model is relevant here because it helps to include more actors than just 
international/local players in the analytical locus, and thus contributes to bridging 
the gap between the local and the international. More importantly, being attentive 
to the regional dimension could necessitate the revision of some of the concepts, 
such as “local ownership,” which are frequently advocated by certain strands of 
the literature on peacebuilding. Analytically, RPFs consist of the following social 
“kinds” or ontologies: 
Actors
(1) States. Regional states play a constitutive and fundamental role in conflict trans-
formation by possessing a multitude of relevant tools. For example, cross-regional 
elite connections may prove influential in forming alliances and initiating de-esca-
lation measures. Further, the states of a region usually share economic, social, cul-
tural, and security interests upon which common strategies can be drawn. However, 
the stance and impact of strong/large regional states might be indispensable for 
forging coalitions, creating or activating defence pacts, and for collaborating with 
and invigorating regional organisations (ROs) for the achievement of region-wide 
solutions to intransigent intra-state violent conflicts. Additionally, this state-based 
rationale could also be applied to the specific type of regime in power that controls 
the institutions of the state. 
(2) ROs. RPFs are characterised by proactive and engaging ROs, which have 
the institutional capital of being historically embedded within their regions in ways 
that allow them to impose authority and to monitor events (for example ceasefire 
and anti-smuggling agreements), as well as to activate mechanisms that range from 
mediation to the deployment of armed forces. Again, the influence of ROs corre-
lates with the extent to which they have been historically adopted and recognised 
by the regional – and mainly the big – states as institutions for peace and regional 
cooperation.
(3) Militias, paramilitaries, and non-state armed groups. The motives for armed 
groups’ formation (such as greed and grievance) are to be expected in both con-
vergent and divergent RCFs. However the agency and autonomy of armed groups 
dwindle in RPFs, which demonstrate efficiency in pursuing goal-oriented strategies 
for disarming and demobilising non-state armed groups. Examples include cutting 
off their sources of financing and strangling the usual transborder logistical routes 
which sustain them. Alternatively, regional states which aim at defeating a regional 
bloc benefitting from conflict may harness their mobilisation capabilities so as to 
form their own militias that then fight along their formal armed forces.
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Conflict Dynamics 
The seemingly static positioning of regional actors might be put to the test, and 
hence they become engaged, due to the manner in which the conflict at hand un-
folds. With the passage of time, intra-state violence could threaten the entire re-
gional security architecture. In this context, previously uninvolved states sense the 
potential jeopardy to their domestic stability should the conflict spill over to affect 
their status and interests. Also, for mature and embedded regional institutions, the 
threshold of inaction is fragile and thus their engagement is posited to occur at the 
early stages of a given conflict’s escalation. Further, what is distinctive about RPFs 
is their resilience in responding to emerging escalations, due to established institu-
tional cultures of addressing similar threats and working collectively with regional 
stakeholders to design concrete and concerted plans to counteract them. 
The following will provide a short overview of the importance of such a regional 
perspective for three world regions, highlighting important differences regarding 
respective conflict and peace formations. Latin America is important for its ending 
of war and armed conflict but high levels of social and criminal violence. The Mid-
dle East is currently the main international “war theatre.” Sub-Saharan Africa is a 
region with a very interesting regional peace architecture meanwhile.
Latin America – A Zone of Peace?
Latin American governments declared the region a “zone of peace” at the summit 
of the Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC) in Havana 
on 27 January 2014. Under a peace concept limited to the absence of war or armed 
conflict, as the data provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program represents, 
Latin America would thus indeed be a zone of peace. However there have always 
been other forms of violence in the region, ones that have become more prominent 
in the twenty-first century. Interpersonal, social, and criminal violence make Latin 
America the most violent region in the world. Homicide rates are among the high-
est worldwide in some countries, and above the level classified as a pandemic by 
the World Health Organization in most of the region. While the academic debate 
analyses these types of violence separately, they are in fact interrelated and overlap 
on the ground. The RPF is shaped by the absence of a state monopoly on force and 
a lack of constructive conflict transformation.
Democratisation increased the possibilities for political participation via elec-
tions, and depending on the specific legislation in the respective countries via oth-
er mechanisms such as referenda, consultations, and the like too. However, the 
“output” of most democratic regimes in Latin America with regard to these issues 
has been highly deficient. The political systems have been unable, or the govern-
ing elites unwilling, to genuinely transform deeply ingrained social conflict beyond 
the mantra of economic growth and often election-related distributive policies. The 
year 2019 saw high levels of social mobilisation and protest across the region, being 
answered by many governments with highly repressive policies. 
There are at least two links between the structural conflicts and current types 
of violence being witnessed in Latin America. First, criminal and social violence 
find fertile ground in the traditional development patterns based on the extraction 
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of natural resources. This model reproduces social marginalisation, as well as per-
petuates a lack of viable livelihoods and of decent work. Second, agents of structural 
change – such as human rights defenders and representatives of indigenous, social, 
and ecological movements – have become the main target of contemporary political 
violence.
While every country and subregion has its specific characteristics, regarding 
conflict and peace formations there are at least three common features to be found 
across the Latin American region: 
 • The dominance of traditional/oligarchic elites and their armed allies or non-
state actors, not just in rural areas or border regions. 
 • The reproduction of repressive and violent responses to protest and opposition 
(“iron fist, zero tolerance”), and the militarisation of public-security policies.
 • The fluidity of borders, where political as well as criminal non-state armed ac-
tors can move from one country to another without difficulty. 
While Latin American governments have signed many plans and agreements for 
regional cooperation, peacebuilding, and violence prevention, they seem stuck in 
path-dependent responses to increasing social conflict. Therefore, the respective 
political systems and most of their actors face decreasing levels of legitimacy and 
trust. This is a dangerous mix for the future.
Peace in the Middle East – A Chimera?
The Middle East today represents a region where domestic turmoil, sectarianism, 
irredentism, state rivalry and failure, humanitarian crises, the proliferation of non-
state armed groups, and terrorism have all become characterising features. But de-
picting armed conflicts as revolving primarily around identity politics is over-sim-
plistic and may lead to misguided policy prescriptions, such as breaking up fragile 
states along ethno-sectarian lines or even discerning the patterns of conflicts in the 
region as occurring only because of religious imperatives. What is needed, contrari-
wise, is a nuanced look at the dynamics of conflict formation and transformation in 
the Middle East (and North Africa), and whether potential peace formations could 
emerge and be capitalised on for designing effective peacebuilding initiatives.
The Arab Spring uprisings have played a role in the erosion of the regional order 
in the Middle East, but without presenting clear features of a new one in the mak-
ing. As a result, alliance configurations in the region oscillate between two general 
patterns: (1) the escalation of enmities, such as between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and 
(2) the breakup of previous alliances, as exemplified by the recent Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) crisis and the ensuing Saudi/Emirati-led boycotting of Qatar. These 
patterns are not mutually exclusive; rather, they feed into each other – with con-
sequences that transcend the Gulf region in spreading to countries like Iraq, Syria, 
and to Libya in North Africa. Further, these regional dynamics have had an effect on 
the strength and persistence of non-state armed groups, and also on the coherence 
and influence of ROs such as the League of Arab States (LAS) and the GCC.
Scrutinising the escalation of violence in the Middle East, as well as the pat-
terns of rivalry and of alliance formation and transformation, reveals that envision-
ing peace should be region-sensitive and embedded within the regional structures 
   8    GIGA FOCUS | GLOBAL | NO. 1 | JANUARY 2021 
of power; include state, sub-state, and supra-state actors; and, incorporate both 
formal and informal institutions of war-making and peacebuilding. 
In contrast to Latin America, interstate conflicts play a major role in the Middle 
East. Saudi-Iranian rivalry reflects a seemingly rigid and deep-seated confrontation 
on both the material and ideational levels, whereas the intra-Gulf disputes might 
be more issue-based and less intractable in existential terms. Further, what con-
tributes to the absence of RPFs in the Middle East is the nonexistence of influential 
ROs, due to intra-organisational fragmentation among member states. Hence, the 
gaps that arise from state weakness, fragility, or collapse are not filled by organisa-
tional plans and actions; instead, a plethora of non-state armed groups vie for the 
taking over of the spaces left vacant by the state – which, in turn, constitutes fertile 
ground for rival states to invest in conflict and violence escalation. 
In sum, peacebuilding in the Middle East should be looked at through the prism 
of the region and with attention paid to the manner in which RCFs can shift from 
divergence to convergence – thus creating space for RPFs to emerge. For interna-
tional donors and peacebuilders like the UN and the European Union, peace in the 
region thus needs to be coupled with transforming the zero-sum modality of conflict 
into a setting where collective solutions are possible. In addition, ROs need to be 
strengthened in order to compensate for state weakness and to work as focal points 
for coordinating constructive momentum. 
Sub-Saharan Africa – Concrete Moves towards RPFs?
Sub-Saharan Africa arguably resembles the Middle East in terms of the spread of vi-
olence and conflict dynamics. The region had, by the end of the 1990s, witnessed the 
genocide in Rwanda (1994), the First Congo War (1996–1997), an ethnic war in Bu-
rundi (1993), in addition to numerous military coups continent-wide. The majority 
of conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2018 remained internal ones, 
with internal-turned-internationalised armed conflicts, such as the civil wars in Li-
beria and Sierra Leone, occurring less frequently. At the same time, nearly 50 per 
cent of the armed conflicts were discontinued due to low activity and/or actors ceas-
ing hostilities. However sub-Saharan Africa differs from the Middle East in terms 
of its ability to forge RPFs, with the former drawing on a multitude of regional and 
subregional organisations and institutions possessing an array of mechanisms for 
conflict prevention and transformation. 
A remarkable achievement of the African Union’s Constitutive Act was that it 
laid the legal foundation for the establishment, in 2002, of the African Peace and 
Security Architecture (APSA) pillared by eight Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs) and two Regional Mechanisms (RMs). From diplomacy to military inter-
vention, the APSA draws on a multitude of tools to ensure peace and security in sub-
Saharan Africa. Similarly, regionally powerful and influential states may contribute 
to or hinder the materialisation of the related designs of the APSA and the RECs in 
a given context. 
In 2016, 28 out of 67 conflicts (42 per cent) were addressed by the APSA (Ntab 
and Bekele 2018: 9). Consequently, the report concludes that 78 per cent of inter-
ventions were successful or partly successful. While policymakers, practitioners, 
and academics might debate the interpretation of this portrayal of the APSA’s ef-
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ficiency, the message which interests us is that when compared to the institutions 
and organisations of the Middle East (mainly the LAS and the GCC) and their ca-
pacity to curb the tide of violence and wars sweeping that particular region, sub-
Saharan Africa, and the AU more broadly, emerge as a conglomerate of various 
subregions which have managed to create and develop regional and subregional 
peace formations that are underpinned by a complex legal, political, organisation-
al, institutional, and operational infrastructure that avails itself of a wide range of 
mechanisms – such as mediation, sanctions, and military intervention. These RPFs 
prove indispensable for achieving the sub-Saharan African strategic objectives of 
conflict prevention, transformation, and resolution, as well as of peace-making and 
peacekeeping. Also, the rivalry between the swing states in the Middle East (mainly 
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey) makes them pale in comparison with their African 
counterparts in regard to conflict de-escalation, peace-making, and peacebuilding 
efforts. 
However, this should not lead us to falsely assume that the sub-Saharan RPFs 
are flawless or that conflicts on the continent are ebbing away completely. Rather, 
miscellaneous challenges confront the AU and its various peace and security or-
gans. Examples include shortcomings in regard to logistical support and planning, 
alongside the slowness with regard to decision-making at the APSA’s Peace and 
Security Council when it comes to emerging conflicts or crises.
In conclusion, the challenges that lie ahead for the AU and its various peace and 
security institutions demand long-term coordination between the different agen-
cies involved, with the need to find more efficient avenues of self-reliance regarding 
funding particularly. Yet, what the study of sub-Saharan Africa shows is that the 
regional ability to found and consolidate RPFs could be a prerequisite for moving 
from violence and war to peace. Phrased differently, the absence of such peace for-
mations in tandem with no will on the part of the regional swing states to cooperate 
in preserving peace and resolving conflict in the Middle East is what makes peace 
in the latter region chimerical. This leads again to the emphasis of a fundamental 
point: the regional context matters.
Implications for International Peacebuilding Support
International organisations and donors face a series of challenges in their policies 
of peacebuilding support that adopting a regional perspective might help overcome. 
Every armed conflict and war is unique, as is every peacebuilding process. How-
ever, there are regional patterns shaping conflict as well as peace formations at the 
intersection of global developments and local specificities. “Global” peacekeeping 
efforts by the UN, the EU, other multilateral institutions, or by transnational non-
governmental organisations can only succeed in supporting peacebuilding if they 
account for local as well as regional contextual conditions. As such, they need to 
take into account transborder military, political, economic, and social networks in 
the regions because they exert significant influence on conflict and peace dynam-
ics – no matter if at the interstate or intra-state level. The presence or absence of 
regional powers or swing states, ROs, or of cross-border militias, paramilitaries, or 
criminal groups influences peacebuilding efforts in one way or another. 
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Over the last few decades peacebuilders have made a significant effort to in-
crease the analysis of contexts, especially at the local level. However, the regional 
one has been largely ignored – with the exception of the outsourcing of peacebuild-
ing to ROs, as in the “African solutions to African problems” approach. Regional 
peace and conflict formations need to be included beyond this cooperation, while 
multilateral institutions, donors, and other actors involved in the peacebuilding do-
main need to pay close attention. Peace and conflict assessments need to factor in 
these regional developments.
The current situation in the Middle East shows that local peace initiatives are 
not viable if regional and geopolitical power dynamics persist and fuel neighbour-
hood conflicts like in Syria or Yemen. The zone of peace in Latin America demon-
strates that violence needs to be addressed beyond its collective, organised manifes-
tation on the basis of political aims – that is, in the form of war. At the same time, 
the Latin American region shows that its peace architecture is unable to confront 
the related security problems and to develop innovative peacebuilding approaches. 
In most of Latin America vested interests prefer traditional repressive strategies, 
intensifying violence most of all for civil society and reform-oriented actors such as 
human rights defenders. The African continent, home to many ROs and to reason-
ably well-functioning peace mechanisms, serves as an example for the value added 
by regional integration – even in the face of persisting conflict. The better sub-
regional organisations and regional integration work, the more chance for peace-
building success there is. 
All world regions have in common the existence of different transnational ac-
tors who pose a serious threat to both local and regional peace. In Latin America, 
it is criminal networks that are responsible for thousands of fatalities every year. 
In the Middle East, it is mainly transnational terrorist organisations like Al-Qaida 
or ISIS and the overarching “Cold War” between Saudi Arabia and Iran and their 
respective constituencies that have this effect. In sub-Saharan Africa, it is mostly 
militias and paramilitary groups who make strategic use of porous borders and a 
lack of state security in remote areas. However, all these actors can only prosper in 
cooperation with national elites and local allies. They need to be analysed, included, 
or marginalised in peacebuilding policies.
The regional level offers the possibility for meaningful donor coordination and 
joint multilateral action, but this should not lead to a minimalistic approach seek-
ing only the end of war or a certain degree of stabilisation. All initiatives need a 
clear focus on long-term peacebuilding, as a process of social change required for 
the constructive transformation of conflict. Regional economic and social networks 
are central to sustainable development, and to transforming structural conditions – 
leading either to the violent escalation of conflict or to the fostering of more peace-
ful societies.
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